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Abstract Abstrak
There is an effort to adopt an internationally­
accepted legal definition for ‘terrorism’ since 
such definition will enhance international 
cooperation in fighting terrorism, which at 
the moment is fragmented and ineffective. 
However, various obstacles e.g. political 
heterogeneity or ideological discrepancy 
arise when seeking a uniformed definition 
of terrorism, hence this study.
Dunia internasional berupaya untuk mene­
tapkan definisi legal ‘terorisme’ yang 
diterima secara umum karena definisi ini 
dapat meningkatkan kerjasama internasi­
onal dalam melawan terorisme yang saat 
ini masih terkotak­kotak dan tidak efektif. 
Tulisan ini membahas pelbagai kesulitan 
yang muncul dalam upaya mencari definisi 
tersebut, seperti masalah keragaman politik 
dan kesenjangan ideologi antarnegara.
Keywords: definition, terrorism, human rights, international law.
A. Introduction
It is difficult for the international 
community to prosecute and punish a 
criminal act if the act in question has not 
been universally defined. Without agreement 
on a general definition of terrorism, the 
famous phrase often heard during the period 
of de-colonization that “one man’s terrorist 
is another man’s freedom fighter” remains 
relevant. For Mrs. Thatcher, Mr. Cheney, and 
the apartheid regime in South Africa, Nelson 
Mandela was a terrorist; for many others he 
was a freedom fighter. The same can be said 
about Yasser Arafat and Abdullah Ocalan.1
The absence of a general definition of 
terrorism at the international level has also 
created legal uncertainty. Powerful states 
will impose their own definition of the term 
on others; lesser powers will attempt to 
identify and punish terrorism as they deem 
fit, possibly undermining human rights and 
humanitarian law.2 In the Americas, “state 
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sley, at p. 188.
2 Surya P. Subedi, The War on Terror and U.N. Attempts to Adopt a Comprehensive Convention on International 
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terrorism” has a notable history. “Many 
governments have engaged in kidnappings, 
forced disappearances and other egregious 
human rights violations against their own 
populations, often under the guise of fighting 
terrorism.”3 Human rights defenders were 
attacked. Only ten days after September 
11, 2001, the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Human Rights declared herself “very 
apprehensive” about the risk of an erosion 
of civil liberties. on September 25, 2001, she 
warned that there were countries who were 
“gearing up to tackle terrorism by clamping 
down human rights defenders.”4 
The effort to prosecute international 
terrorism cannot be strengthened until the 
international community formulates a ge-
neric definition. A definition can be useful 
for making punishable related or supporting 
conduct, such as fund-raising or money-
laundering in relation to terrorism. It can 
also serve the purpose of making a terrorist 
context an aggravating feature of common 
crimes.5 A definition of terrorism is necessary 
for establishing jurisdiction for such crimes, 
and for staking out the field where we want 
to give extra powers to public security and 
law enforcement agencies.6 Furthermore, the 
prosecution of an individual for “terrorism” 
as such (rather than for common crimes like 
murder), might go some way towards satis-
fying public indignation at terrorists acts and 
placating popular demands for justice.7
The non-existence of the definition 
does not mean that international terrorism 
cannot legally be prosecuted. Professor 
Oscar Schachter remarked that the absence 
of a comprehensive definition “does not 
mean that international terrorism is not 
identifiable.”8 The absence of a definition 
of terrorism does not mean that serious acts 
of violence, such as those carried out on 
September 11, are not criminalized under 
international (and of course domestic) 
criminal law. Acts of “terrorism” are covered 
by multiple specific conventions addressing 
particular types or aspects of terrorism, 
including hijacking, hostage taking, 
violence against internationally protected 
persons, terrorist bombing and financing of 
terrorism.9 
International efforts to curb terrorist 
acts in contemporary international law 
first found expression in the League of 
Nations. In the framework of the League 
of Nations, two treaties were drafted and 
finalized in 1937, namely the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of 
3 Organization of American States: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2002, Report on Terrorism 
and Human Rights, General Secretariat, Washington D.C., at p. 19.
4 Sibylle Kapferer, “Ends and Means in Politics: International Law as Framework for Political Decision-Mak-
ing”, 2005, in Paul Eden and Therese O’Donnell (eds), September 11, 2001: A Turning Point in International 
Law?, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, at p. 52.
5 Wyboo P. Heere (ed), 2003, Terrorism and the Military: International Legal Implications, The Haque, T.M.C., 
Asser Press, at p. 118.
6 Wyboo P. Heere (ed), ibid, at p. 118.
7 Ben Saul, 2006, Defining Terrorism in International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, at p. 4.
8 Oscar Schachter, 1989, The Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases, 11 Hous.J.INT’L L. 309, 
309.
9 Helen Duffy, 2005, The “War on Terror” and the Framework of International Law, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, at p. 41.
444 MIMBAR HUKUM Volume 21, Nomor 3, Oktober 2009, Halaman 409 - 628
Terrorism (1937 Terrorism Convention)10 
and the Convention for the Creation of an 
International Criminal Court, which was 
to have jurisdiction for terrorist offenses 
defined in the first-named Convention.11 The 
1937 Convention was intended, inter alia, to 
oblige parties thereto to establish as offenses 
in their national criminal legislation certain 
specific acts listed in Article 2, as well as to 
prosecute, or extradite, the alleged offenders 
if certain conditions were met.12
 Article 1 (2) of this convention 
defines terrorism as: “criminal acts directed 
against a State and intended to or calculated 
to create a state of terror in the minds of 
particular persons, or a group of persons 
or the general public.” Thus, at least the 
English text of the convention appeared to 
make it clear that what transformed the acts 
listed into terrorist acts was the existence of 
a special intent on the part of the offender to 
create a state of terror.13
The immediate problem with such a 
general definition is that it could criminalize 
the legitimate acts of persons struggling 
against state oppression or to set up a free 
state, and hence be in conflict with the 
right to self determination.14 This definition 
protects states from being prosecuted as 
a perpetrator or sponsor of terrorism, for 
terrorism can only be committed by non-
state actors or individual persons. However, 
this convention never entered into force for 
failure to receive the necessary signatures, 
accession or ratification and also as a result 
of the outbreak, only two years after its 
adoption, of the Second World War.15 The 
broad definition of terrorism contributed 
to the low number of signatures and 
ratifications. Britain, for example, did not 
ratify it because of anticipated difficulties 
with drawing up the required implementing 
legislation.16 Despite never entering into 
force, the League Convention remains 
important for the range and detail of legal 
issues it covered, many of which resurfaced 
in ongoing UN debates about definition in 
the 1970s and 2000s.17 Its definition served 
for many years as a benchmark, appearing 
early in the drafting of the 1954 ILC draft 
10 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, Nov. 16, 1937, League of Nations Doc.
C.546M.383 (1937) reprinted in 7 International Legislation 862 (Manley O. Hudson ed., 1941)
11 R.A. Friedlander, “terrorism”, in R. Bernardt (ed.), 1999, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Amster-
dam, North-Holland, (2nd edn.), Vol.IV, at p. 845.
12 See: Articles 8-10, Andrea Gioia, The UN Conventions on the Prevention and Suppression of International 
Terrorism in, Giuseppe Nesi (ed), 2006, International Cooperation in Counter­terrorism, Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, Aldershot, at p. 3.
13 Andrea Gioia, The UN Conventions on the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism, in Gi-
useppe Nesi, 2006, International Cooperation in Counter­terrorism: The United Nations and Regional Orga­
nizations in the Fight Against Terrorism, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot, p.  4.
14 Claire de Than and Edwin Shorts, 2003, International Criminal Law and Human Rights, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, at p. 233.
15 Andrea Gioia, supra note 13, at p. 4.
16 Reuven Young, 2006, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International 
Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation, Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review, at p. 6.
17 Christopher L. Blakesley, 2006, Terror and Anti­Terrorism: A Normative and Practical Assessment, Transna-
tional Publishers, Ardsley, at p. 31.
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Code of Offenses against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, and shaping a much-
cited 1994 General Assembly Declaration.18
The United Nations subsequently took 
up similar initiatives in defining terrorism 
through negotiations of multilateral treaties 
and the work of bodies at various levels 
of organizations, after the collapse of the 
League of Nations. However, as of this 
writing, the UN has still not come up with 
any consensus on a generic definition of 
terrorism. This failure has not weakened the 
international community’s determination to 
fight terrorism through the use of international 
law. However, instead of using a generic 
approach, the international community looks 
at terrorism through piecemeal or sectoral 
angles as reflected in the forms of terrorism 
contained in the sectoral anti-terrorism 
conventions that have been adopted since 
1963 until 2007. These sectoral conventions 
are:
1. Convention on Offenses and Certain 
Other Acts Committed on Board 
Aircraft (1963)19
2. Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970)20
3. Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation (1971)21
4. Convention on the Prevention and Pu-
nishment of Offenses against Interna-
tionally Protected Persons, Including 
Diplomatic Agents (1973)22
5. International Convention against the 
Taking of Hostages (1979)23
6. Convention on the Physical Protection 
of Nuclear Material (1980)24
7. Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports 
Serving International Civil Aviation, 
Supplementary to the Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Civil Aviation 
(1988)25
8. Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation (1988)26
9. Protocol for the Suppression of Un-
lawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed 
Platforms Located on the Continental 
Shelf (1988)27
10. Convention on the Marking of Plastic 
Explosives for the Purpose of Detection 
(1991)28
11. International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 
(1997)29
18 Christopher L. Blakesley, ibid, at p. 31.
19 United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 704, p.218. Available at http://untreaty.un.org.
20 This Convention was signed at the Haque on 16 December 1970 and entered into force on 14 December 1971. 
Available at www.onodc.org.
21 Available at http://untreaty.un.org.
22 ibid.
23 ibid.
24 ibid.
25 ibid.
26 ibid.
27 ibid.
28 ibid.
29 ibid.
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12. International Convention for the Sup-
pression of the Financing of Terrorism 
(1999)30
13. International Convention for the Sup-
pression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 
(2000)31
All the thirteen multilateral anti-terro-
rism conventions, with the exception of the 
1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention, 
prohibit only single and specific instances of 
terrorism involving indiscriminate violence, 
which was most likely to be committed by 
terrorists, and which imposed upon States 
an obligation to either extradite or prosecute 
the offender.32 The logic of the “prosecute 
or extradite” doctrine is that it matters less 
who should try a terrorist than that the global 
terrorist should be tried by some state party 
(commonly referred to, therefore, as the “no 
safe haven” principle).33
These conventions deal with both 
punishment and prevention across disparate 
subject areas. They proscribe conduct and 
broadly speaking, define the following 
crimes:34 physical attacks on internationally 
protected persons and their (or their 
government’s) property;35 the seizure of 
hostages to compel third parties to act in a 
certain way;36 the use of explosives or other 
lethal devices against public targets with 
the intention to cause death, serious injury, 
or major economic loss;37 the unlawful 
possession of radioactive material with the 
intention to cause death or serious injury 
or the unlawful use of such material with 
the intention to cause death, serious bodily 
injury, substantial property or environmental 
damage, or to compel a person, organization, 
or state to do or not to do something;38 
jeopardizing the safety of a civil aviation 
aircraft or persons or property onboard;39 
gaining control of a civil aviation aircraft 
by use or threat of force or intimidation;40 
doing things that endanger the safety of civil 
aviation aircraft;41 acts of violence that cause 
serious injury or death or endanger safety at 
a civil aviation airport;42 the threat or use 
of nuclear material that cause or is likely 
to cause serious injury, death, or property 
damage;43 and gaining control over a vessel 
30 ibid.
31 ibid.
32 A.R. Perera, Reviewing the UN Conventions on Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive Terrorism Convention, 
in C. Fijnaut, J. Wouters & F. Naert (eds.), 2004, Legal Instruments in the Fight against International Terror­
ism: A Transatlantic Dialogue, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, at p. 569.
33 C.L. Lim, The Question of a Generic Definition of Terrorism under General International Law, in Victor V. 
Ramraj (eds.), 2005, Global Anti­Terrorism Law and Policy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, at p. 
46.
34 Reuven Young, supra note 16, at p. 10.
35 Internationally Protected Persons Convention, art. 2(1) (a), (b).
36 Hostages Convention, art. 1 (1).
37 Bombings Convention, art. 2 (1).
38 Nuclear Terrorism Convention, art. 2 (1) (a), (b)
39 Tokyo Convention, art.1 (1) (b).
40 Hague Convention, art. 1 (a).
41 Montreal Convention, art. 1 (1).
42 Montreal Airports Protocol, art.II (1).
43 Nuclear Materials Convention, art.7 (1).
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or fixed maritime platform by threat, force, 
or intimidation or endangering the safe 
navigation of the vessel or fixed maritime 
platform.44
Despite not necessarily referring to 
terrorism expressly, these conventions and 
their prohibitions are intended to address 
terrorism.45 These treaties aim at coordina-
ting the prosecution and punishment of 
those terrorist offenses by the contracting 
States. The primary purpose of those treaties 
is to achieve the prompt and effective 
punishment of terrorism by national 
authorities. Each contracting State is duty 
bound to co-operate in and lend assistance 
to the repression of terrorism, that is, the 
apprehension and prosecution or extradition 
of alleged perpetrators of terrorist acts. No 
international body is entrusted with the task 
of prosecuting and punishing those criminal 
offenses.46 
These various subject-specific treaties 
remain the most reliable sources of interna-
tional law today as to what terrorism looks 
like. Beyond these treaties there arises the 
question of what a general customary law 
definition would look like, and whether 
these treaty rules may have stimulated broad 
acceptance by states of parallel customary 
rules since these treaties have arguably re-
sulted from the opinio juris communitatis of 
a significant number of states.47 The existing 
conventions are well supported by states: in 
2002, 175 states were parties to the Hague 
Convention of 1970 on the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; 176 to the 
Montreal Convention of 1971 on the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety 
of Civil Aviation; 119 to the 1973 Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes against Internationally Protected 
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents; 108 
to the 1979 Convention against the Taking 
of Hostages; 69 to the 1988 Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation; 64 to the 
1997 International Convention for the Sup-
pression of Terrorist Bombings; and 39 to the 
1999 International Convention for the Sup-
pression of the Financing of Terrorism.48
Thus, in order to prosecute terrorism 
based on these conventions, terrorism must 
not be seen as a generic term, but be seen 
as a single and specific instances of terrorist 
acts. These conventions regard as criminal 
all terrorist acts whether they emanate from 
private individuals or State officials.49 on the 
whole, therefore, the sectoral conventions 
confirm the assumption that some offenses 
can be considered in themselves as offenses 
of international concern, irrespective of any 
specific “terrorist” intent or purpose. Indeed, 
the principal merit of the sectoral approach 
is that it avoids the need to define terrorism 
or terrorist acts.”50 A definition would 
only be necessary if the punishment of the 
44 Maritime Convention, art. 3(1) (vessels); Fixed Platforms Convention, art. 2(1).
45 Reuven Yound, supra note 16, at p. 10.
46 Antonio Cassese, 2003, International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, at p. 130.
47 C.L. Lim, The Question of a Generic Definition of Terrorism under General International Law, in Victor V. Ram-
raj (eds.), 2005, Global Anti­Terrorism Law and Policy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, at p. 60.
48 John Dugard, supra note 1, at p. 205.
49 Antonio Cassese, supra note 43, at 130
50 Andrea Gioia, supra note 13, at 10
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relevant offenses were made conditional on 
the existence of a specific terrorist intent; but 
this would be counter-productive, inasmuch 
as it would result in unduly restricting their 
suppression.51 on the other hand, the mere 
labelling of these offenses as “terrorist” 
offenses serves no operative legal purpose, 
and leaves the door open for new treaties 
to put the same label on other categories of 
offenses.52
B.	 Obstacles	to	Defining	Terrorism
The effort to a find a universal legal 
definition of terrorism is still an unfinished 
agenda at the UN. Thus, there is no universally 
accepted legal definition of terrorism.53 
The difficulty in reaching a consensus on 
the definition of this term is more political 
than technical. International criminal justice 
is not a “technical instrumental-oriented 
enterprise,” but rather is densely implicated 
in international politics.54 The problem is due 
to the political component of terrorism.55 The 
major powers insist on limiting the crime to 
private actors, excluding from it State actors; 
small powers, meanwhile, insist on including 
State actors, while some of them would like 
to exclude “freedom fighters.”56 
For some, terrorism exists in the 
mind of the beholder, depending upon 
one’s political views and national origins. 
For others, terrorism consists of criminal 
acts, according to the laws of any civilized 
society.57 The general acceptability of a 
definition of terrorism obviously depends 
on a certain political homogeneity or at least 
ideological proximity.58 Thus, the failure to 
reach a precise and objective definition of 
terrorism has been caused by the fact that: (i) 
terrorism takes different forms; although it is 
usually equated with political subversion, it 
is employed at times by governments, and it 
is used as an instrument of syndicated crime; 
(ii) the criteria for defining “terrorism” is 
generally subjective since it is mainly based 
on political considerations; (iii) above all, 
terrorism is prompted by a wide range of 
motives depending on time and the prevailing 
ideology.59 The problem of finding a proper 
definition is that “the spread of terror, the 
spread of fear can be applied downwards as 
well as upwards. on the one hand, certain 
groupings can use terror as an attempt to 
influence governmental decisions or even to 
demolish the structure of a state. on the other 
hand, the spread of fear by some government 
51 Andrea Gioia, supra note 13, at 10
52 Andrea Gioia, supra note 13, at 10
53 Roberta Arnold, The ICC as a New Instrument for Repressing Terrorism, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, 
2004 at 3
54 F Megret, “The Politics of International Criminal Justice” (2002) 13 EJIL 1261, 1280
55 Roberta Arnold, supra note 53, at 4
56 Georges Abi-Saab, The Proper Role of International Law in Combating Terrorism, in Andrea Bianchi (ed), 
Enforcing International Law Norms against Terrorism, Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2004 at xx
57 R.A. Friedlander, “terrorism”, in R. Bernardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Amsterdam, 
North Holland, Vol.9, 1986 (1st edn.), at 373
58 Gerhard Hafner, The Definition of the Crime of Terrorism, in Giuseppe Nesi (ed), 2006, International Coop­
eration in Counter­terrorism: The United Nations and Regional Organizations in the Fight Against Terrorism, 
Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot, at p. 36.
59 Omer Y. Elegab, 1997, International Law Documents Relating to Terrorism, London, Cavendish Publishing 
Limited, at p. xix.
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is used downwards, against its own citizen, 
as a method of governance and as a means 
for remaining in power.60
The divergent political perceptions and 
attitudes adopted by states towards a particu-
lar “terrorist” or “militant” group, as dictated 
by its own political priorities and compul-
sions, underlined the work of the UN in ad-
dressing international terrorism.61 The issue 
of terrorism was never very far away from 
the friendships, alliances and calculations 
of realpolitik that are a dominant feature 
of United Nations voting practice.62 When 
terrorism was taken up in the UN General 
Assembly (UNGA), it quickly become clear 
that no consensus on a general definition was 
possible. The delimitation between terrorists 
and freedom fighters pursuing self-determi-
nation proved especially insurmountable.63 
Another important question that has caused 
division among members of the internation-
al community, especially between developed 
and developing countries is whether the ac-
tivities of official forces of a state can be ca-
tegorized as terrorist offenses.
1. Freedom Fighters
The UNGA adopted its first resolution 
on the subject of international terrorism in 
1972.64 The title of the UNGA Resolution 
3034 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972 reveals 
quite transparently, the divergence of 
perception and approach in the UN treatment 
of the subject at that time:
Measures to prevent international 
terrorism which endanger or takes innocent 
human lives or jeopardizes fundamental 
freedoms, and study of the underlying 
causes of those forms of terrorism and acts 
of violence which lies in misery, frustration, 
grievance and despair and cause some people 
to sacrifice human lives, including their own, 
in an attempt to effect radical changes.65
The title of this resolution is a clear 
evidence that showed us how divided the 
international community was when they 
discussed the issue of terrorism. The aftermath 
of the devastating impact of the Munich 
massacre, activities of the Red Brigades, 
the Baader-Meinhof and radical Palestine 
and other expatriate groups, lay behind 
the emphasis the West European countries 
placed on the need for effective measures to 
prevent and counter international terrorism.66 
The national liberation struggles, then raging 
in South Africa, and the struggle against 
foreign occupation in the Middle East, led 
the non-aligned countries to place emphasis 
on the need to address the underlying causes 
of terrorism in any U.N. initiative on the 
subject.67 Operative paragraph four of this 
resolution condemns “the continuation of 
60 Wyboo P. Heere (ed), supra note 5, at p. 118.
61 A.R. Perera, supra note 32, at p. 567.
62 C.L. Lim, supra note 47, at p. 43.
63 J.Wouters and F. Naert, Shockwaves through International Law after 11 September: Finding the Right Res-
ponses to the Challenges of International Terrorism, in C.Fijnaut, J. Wouters & F. Naert (eds.), 2004, Legal 
Instruments in the Fight against International Terrorism: A Transnational Dialogue, Martinus Nijhoff Pub-
lishers, Leiden, at p. 413.
64 Christian Walter, Defining Terrorism in National and International Law, in Christian Walter (eds.), 2004, Terro­
rism as a Challenge for National and International Law: Security versus Liberty?, Springer, Berlin, at p. 35.
65 A.R. Perera, supra note 32 at 568
66 ibid.
67 ibid.
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repressive and terrorist acts by colonial, 
racist and alien regimes in denying peoples 
of their legitimate right to self-determination 
and independence and other human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.” The qualification of 
acts by “colonial, racist and alien regimes” 
as “terrorists” underlines the strong presence 
of de-colonization issue in the debate on 
terrorism.68 
The UNGA position on the question 
of freedom fighters changed following the 
attacks and seizure on the Achille Lauro in 
1985, an act related to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. The Italian ship was captured by 
four members of the Palestine Liberation 
Front (PLF) while sailing from Genoa 
(Italy) to Ashdod (Israel), in retaliation for 
the Israeli attack on the PLO’s headquarter 
in Tunis the previous week. The PLF was 
associated with the PLO and its leader, 
Mohammad Abul Abbas, had a seat on 
the PLO’s executive committee.69 The 
UNGA adopted a resolution stating that it 
“unequivocally condemns, as criminal, all 
acts, methods and practices of terrorism 
wherever and by whomsoever committed, 
including those which jeopardize friendly 
relations among states and their security.”70 
Thus, acts committed in supporting national 
liberation movement is no exception, and be 
considered as terrorism in this resolution. 
Then in 1995, through the General 
Assembly Resolution 53 on “Measures to 
Eliminate Terrorism” adopted on 11 December 
1995, for instance, adopts implicitly and 
improves on the definition of terrorism 
under the now defunct 1937 Convention.71 
It “reiterates” that “criminal acts intended 
or calculated to provoke a state of terror in 
the general public, a group of persons or 
particular persons for political purposes are 
in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever 
the consideration of a political, philosophical, 
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any 
other nature that may be invoked to justify 
them.72 The UNGA’s efforts however, were 
not supported at the regional level. The 
1998 Arab Convention for the Suppression 
of Terrorism73 and the 1999 Convention of 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
68 Christian Walter, supra note 64, at p. 36.
69 Roberta Arnold, supra note 53, at p. 156.
70 G.A. Res.40/61/1985, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/61 (1985)
71 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, 2000, International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, at p. 228.
72 UN Doc. A/RES/5/53.
73 Article 2 of the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism states that: “(1) People’s struggle including 
armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and 
self-determination, in accordance with the principles of international law shall not be considered a terrorist 
crime. (2) None of the terrorist crimes mentioned in the previous article shall be considered political crimes. 
(3) In the Implementation of the provisions of this Convention the following crimes shall not be considered 
political crimes even when politically motivated: (a) aggression against kings and heads of state of Contract-
ing States against their spouses, their ascendants or descendants. (b) Aggression against crown princes or 
vice-presidents or deputy heads of government or ministers in any of the Contracting States. (c) Aggression 
against persons enjoying international immunity including Ambassadors and diplomats in Contracting States 
or in countries of accreditation. (d) Murder or robbery by force against individuals or authorities or means of 
transport and communications. (e) Acts of sabotage and destruction of public properties and properties geared 
for public services, even if belonging to another Contracting State. (f) Crimes of manufacturing, smuggling or 
possessing arms and ammunition or explosives or other materials prepared for committing terrorist crimes. (4) 
All forms of international crimes, including illegal trafficking in narcotics and human beings, money launder-
ing aimed at financing terrorist objectives shall be considered terrorist crimes. M. Cheriff Bassiouni, Interna­
tional Terrorism: Multilateral Conventions (1937­2001) at p. 395 and 431.
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on Combating International Terrorism74 and 
the OAU Convention on the Prevention 
and Combating of Terrorism exclude from 
the ambit of terrorism, acts committed in 
the course of wars of self-determination, 
occupation, aggression and domination 
by foreign forces.75 As a consequence of 
this exemption, at the regional level, the 
violence activities of organizations like 
Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah will not 
be labelled as terrorist acts. Under the Arab 
Convention, it has been noted that, while on 
the one hand relatively banal acts could be 
covered by the terrorism definition (due to 
the broad-reaching conduct covering by the 
definition), on the other, the most serious 
indiscriminate attacks against civilians 
could be excluded “as long as [they were] 
perpetrated in the name of the right to self-
determination.”76 
After the Second World War, 
“terrorism” became mired in the ideological 
cleavages and proxy violence of the Cold 
War. Whereas developed States focused on 
non-State terrorism, developing and socialist 
States emphasized “State terrorism” by 
imperial powers, and regarded anti-colonial 
violence either as an exception to terrorism, 
or as justified by colonialism.77 The change 
in the general political climate in the 
world community following the downfall 
of socialist regime, as well as the gradual 
demise of wars of national liberation, led to 
a change in attitude toward terrorism. For 
instance, General Assembly Resolution on 
terrorism adopted since 1991 have dropped 
the reference to the underlying causes of the 
terrorist phenomenon.78 By the late twentieth 
century, new forms of fundamentalist 
religious terrorism emerged (such as Al-
Qaeda), decoupled from particular territorial 
claims, specific demands like the release of 
prisoners, or restraint in tactics. At the same 
time, “traditional” assassinations continued 
to be used with devastating effect.79
The question of labelling “freedom 
fighter” as terrorist has been resolved 
much earlier in 1977. The First Additional 
74 Article 2 of the Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Ter-
rorism provides that: “(1) Any act committed in a situation of a struggle by any means, including the armed 
struggle against foreign occupation and aggression, for liberation and self-determination, according to the 
principles of international law is not to be considered a crime. Those acts taken in defense of the soil unity of 
any Arab state are also not to be considered crimes. (2) None of the terrorist crimes mentioned in the previous 
article is to be considered as a political crime. In applying the provisions of this Convention, the following 
crimes are not to be considered political crimes- even though they might be politically motivated: (a) aggres-
sion against monarchs, Presidents and Rulers of the Contracting States and their wives or relatives. (b) Ag-
gression on Crown Princes, Vice Presidents, Prime Ministers or Ministers in any of the contracting states or in 
the states to which they are accredited. (c) Aggression on persons enjoying international protection, including 
ambassadors and diplomats in the contracting states or those accredited to them. (d) premeditated murder 
and forceful theft against individuals, authorities, or transport and communications means. (e) Sabotage and 
destruction of public and private property designated for the public service, even if belonging to another of the 
contracting states. (f) Crimes of manufacture, trafficking or possession of arms, ammunition, explosives, or 
any other material prepared for committing terrorist crimes.” M. Cheriff Bassiouni, International Terrorism: 
Multilateral Conventions (1937­2001) at p. 395 and 431.
75 John Dugard, supra note 1, at p. 201-202.
76 Helen Duffy, supra note 9, at p. 36-37.
77 Ben Saul, supra note 7, at p. 2.
78 Antonio Cassese, supra note 49, at p. 124.
79 Ben Saul, supra note 7, at p. 2-3.
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Protocol of 1977 provided an acceptable 
solution to the problem of avoiding labelling 
“freedom fighter” (that is, individuals and 
groups struggling for the realization of self-
determination) as terrorists (Article 44.3 of 
the Protocol granted, on certain conditions, 
legal status as combatants, and prisoner of 
war status in case of capture, to fighters who 
are not members of the armed forces of a state 
and who normally do not carry their arms 
openly).80 Organized groups and members 
thereof enjoyed legitimate combatant status 
under international law, as long as their 
struggle falls within Art 1(4) of the 1977 
Protocol I. The level of violence permitted 
in an ensuing conflict with government 
forces is thereafter regulated by international 
humanitarian law -- and not the various anti-
terrorist treaties -- and applies equally to 
both parties. Not only acts of terrorism, but 
all acts of violence to life or property are 
prohibited against non-combatants.81
2. State Terrorism
If we seek the origins of terrorist 
activity, asking to what the terrorist objects 
and why terrorist methods are resorted to, 
the answer in many individual cases is likely 
to be some manifestation of state policy and 
authority, legally enshrined in the sovereign 
power of the state in question.82 Governments 
are frequently both the ultimate target of 
terrorist activity but also then major actors 
in the process of enforcing rules against 
terrorism. In a sense that is saying no more 
than that the terrorist quarrel is usually one 
between terrorist groups and governments, 
and begins as reaction against governmental 
policy and continues as a governmental or 
intergovernmental reaction against the first 
terrorist reaction.83
Those who perceive matters from the 
perspective of the state, see state violence as 
lawful, however much terror it may induce 
in the minds of population. Those who 
perceive matters from the perspective of 
opponents of state authority see things very 
differently. For them, the state is the terrorist, 
which uses the military arsenal of the state to 
terrorize the people. Those who oppose the 
state by violent means are freedom fighters.84 
In the Middle East, Israel labels Palestinians 
as terrorists and Palestinians accused Israel 
of waging a war of terror. Moreover, while 
the West has no hesitation in categorizing Al 
Qaeda as a terrorist movement, many in the 
Muslim world see Osama Bin Laden and Al 
Qaeda as freedom fighters, engaged in the 
task of liberating the Islamic world from a 
corrupt and decadent West.85
Are the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) 
engaged in lawful military action or in state 
terror? Are the Palestinian militants and 
suicide bombers terrorist or freedom fighters? 
80 Antonio Cassese, 2003, International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, at p. 449.
81 Ilias Bantekas & Susan Nash, 2003, International Criminal Law, Cavendish Publishing, London, at p. 41.
82 Christopher Harding, The Concept of Terrorism and Responses to Global Terrorism: Coming to Terms with 
the Empty Sky, in Paul Eden and Therese O’Donnell, 2005, September 11, 2001: A Turning Point in Interna­
tional and Domestic Law?, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, at p. 175.
83 Christopher Harding, ibid, at p. 168.
84 John Dugard, supra note 1, at p. 188.
85 John Dugard, ibid, at p. 189.
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Is this a conflict regulated by international 
humanitarian law or by international 
criminal law? As long as the conflict in 
the Middle East continues, there can be no 
progress on a comprehensive convention on 
international terrorism.86 Who then can be 
a potential author of terrorism? Recalling, 
but reversing the famous statement of 
the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal that 
war crimes are committed by men rather 
than abstract entities, it may be said that 
terrorism is perpetrated by abstract entities 
as well as by individual human beings.87 The 
responsibility of individuals for established 
crimes under international law-such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes arises irrespective of whether the 
perpetrator was a state officials or a non-
state actor. This is true of all crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court for example, and is made explicit in 
the definition of crimes against humanity, 
which must be committed pursuant to a 
“state or organizational plan or policy.88 In 
addition to abstract entities and individual 
human beings, in fact, acts of terrorism can 
also be committed by state. But state action 
that constitutes international terrorism 
should be distinguished from state support 
for international terrorism by private actors. 
Specific terrorism treaties generally cover 
only acts committed by non-state actors. 
However, these treaties do not themselves 
impose responsibility directly on individuals, 
but on states, and the ability to hold the 
individual to account under them depends 
on incorporation into domestic law.89
The involvement of state in terrorism 
can include the deployment of State agents or 
other persons controlled by that state; groups 
or persons independent from the State, but in 
receipt of financial aid or weapons, or only 
of logistic support; and persons or groups 
receiving no active support, but in respect of 
which a State acquiesces in their use of its 
territory.90 When terrorist acts are perpetrated 
by State officials, alongside individual 
criminal liability there may arise State 
responsibility; the State on whose behalf the 
agent engages in terrorist action may incur 
international responsibility for breaching 
the international customary norms and any 
applicable treaty rules that make it unlawful 
to organize, instigate, assist, finance, or 
participate in terrorist act in territories 
of other States. In the former case States 
may be internationally responsible if they 
acquiesce in, tolerate, or encourage activities 
within their territory directed towards the 
commission of such acts abroad.91
What about terrorist acts committed by 
an organization? Legal action taken against 
the activity of a terrorist organization will 
be pursued against individual members of 
such a grouping, as individuals committing 
or planning criminal acts.92 In an ancillary 
86 John Dugard, ibid, at p. 199.
87 Christopher Harding, supra, note 82 at p. 181.
88 Helen Duffy, supra note 9, at p. 62.
89 Helen Duffy, supra note 9, at p. 62.
90 Ilias Bantekas & Susan Nash, supra note 81, at p. 38.
91 Antonio Cassese, supra note 49, at p. 126.
92 Christopher Harding, supra note 82, at p. 177.
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sense, political and/or legal action may be 
taken at the international level against states 
for indirectly contributing to terrorist activity, 
by supporting the latter in various ways, such 
as providing resources or effective territorial 
asylum (e.g., the justification for taking 
action against the territory of Afghanistan 
following the September 11 attacks).93
It is highly unlikely whether cases 
involving direct or indirect State support 
of terrorism can be solved through the 
mechanisms envisaged in anti-terrorist 
treaties. In contesting the existence of 
the dispute in the Lockerbie case, the US 
and UK argued that the element of State 
sponsored terrorism in that case placed 
the situation outside the framework of the 
1971 Montreal Convention.94 Indeed, these 
conventions were premised on interstate co-
operation under the assumption that terrorist 
acted against the interests of all States. The 
involvement of States in terrorist attacks on 
the territory of other States triggers, instead, 
the application of Art 2(4) of the 1945 
Charter and humanitarian law.95 
Article 2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter prohibits the use of force in 
international relations. One significant 
change the Charter sought to effect is 
to outlaw the use of armed solutions to 
international disputes, and so successful was 
the message and the need to demonstrate 
fidelity to the Charter that the countries of 
the world that would otherwise have been 
prompted to seek armed solutions could no 
longer do so without (1) a Security Council 
resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
or (2) a justification based on unilateral or 
collective self-defence.96
In cases where terrorists act with 
State support, or are harboured by States, 
the criminal law approach described above 
yields few results since, presumably, the 
State involved will neither be willing to 
extradite nor to (effectively) prosecute the 
perpetrators. The problem then arises how 
to deal with States breaching the prohibition 
to support, or participate in, terrorist acts 
committed in or against another State.97 
According to Professor Brownlie, state 
sponsored terrorism is governed mainly, if 
not exclusively, by the available categories 
of international legal thought such as the 
prohibition of the use of force in international 
relations, the doctrine of immutability in 
establishing state responsibility for the acts 
of individuals, the self-defence doctrine and 
so on.98
International jurisprudence that deals 
with the question of the prohibition to 
encourage or tolerate terrorism contained 
in the Corfu Channel case. In the Corfu 
Channel case (1949), the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) held that a State 
violating this rule contravenes the “general 
and well-recognized principle… not to 
allow knowingly its territory to be used for 
acts contrary to the rights of other States.99 
93 Christopher Harding, ibid, at p. 177.
94 Ilias Bantekas & Susan Nash, supra note 81, at p. 39.
95 Ilias Bantekas & Susan Nash, supra note 81, at p. 39.
96 C.L. Lim, supra note 47, at p. 40.
97 J. Wouters and F. Naert, supra note 63, at p. 417.
98 C.L. Lim, supra note 47, at p. 38.
99 Corfu Channel case, 9 Apr. 1949, ICJ Rep. 1949, 4 et seq., p. 22.
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Likewise, the UNGA’s 1970 “Friendly 
Relations Declaration” holds that States 
must refrain from “organizing, instigating, 
assisting or participating in acts of civil strife 
or terrorist acts in another or acquiescing 
in organized activities within its territory 
directed towards the commission of such 
acts, when the acts referred to… involve a 
threat or use of force.100
In the Tehran Hostages case, the ICJ 
held that while the “direct” responsibility 
of Iran for the original takeover of the US 
Embassy in Tehran in 1979 was not proved, 
subsequent statements in the face of incidents 
involving hostage taking by students created 
liability on the part of the state. This approach 
has been followed by the International 
Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) in the Tadic Appeal Judgment and, 
the International Law Commission’s Article 
11 on State Responsibility.101 To paraphrase 
the ICJ in the 1980 Hostages Case, the acts 
of individuals are a catalyst for the State’s 
international responsibility when the State 
authorities: (a) were “aware of the need for 
action on their part”; (b) had “the means of 
their disposal to perform their obligations”; 
and (c) “failed to use the means which were 
at their disposal”.102
In 1986, in the Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua case, the 
ICJ had to define the way in which a State 
could be held responsible for sponsoring the 
terrorist activities of non-State armed group, 
namely the contras. The Court espoused a 
strict conception of control, that is, it had 
to be shown that the United States had 
“effective control” over the actions of the 
contras.103 Although the Court found the US 
to have helped finance, organize, equip, and 
train the Nicaraguan Contras, this was not 
sufficient to render the Contras’ activities 
attributable to the US. Such a level of 
support and assistance did not “warrant the 
conclusion that these forces [were] subject 
to the United States to such an extent that 
any acts they have committed are imputable 
to that State.104 In this case, the Court found 
that it had not been proved that “the US had 
actually exercised such a degree of control 
in all fields as to justify treating the contras 
as acting on its behalf”.105 The United States 
was found to liable for specific activities 
which were proved to be the result of direct 
action on the part of its military or foreign 
nationals in its pay.106
100 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation amongst States 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Annex to UN Doc. A/RES/265 (XXV) (24 Oct.1970), 
1.I.9 and J. Wouters and F. Naert, Shockwaves through International Law after 11 September: Finding the 
Right Responses to the Challenges of International Terrorism, in C. Fijnaut, J. Wouters & F. Naert (eds.), 2004, 
Legal Instruments in the Fight against International Terrorism: A Transatlantic Dialogue, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden, at p. 418.
101 Helen Duffy, supra note 9, at p. 51.
102 1980 Hostages Case, para 68 and Pierre-Marie Dupuy, State Sponsors of Terrorism: Issues of International 
Responsibility, in Andrea Bianchi (ed), 2004, Enforcing International Law Norms against Terrorism, Hart 
Publishing, Portland, at p. 11.
103 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, State Sponsors of Terrorism: Issues of International Responsibility, in Andrea Bianchi 
(ed), 2004, Enforcing International Law Norms against Terrorism, Hart Publishing, Portland, at p. 8.
104 Helen Duffy, supra note 9, at p. 49.
105 Pierre-Marie Dufuy, supra note 103, at p. 8.
106 Helen Duffy, supra note 9, at p. 49-50.
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Acts of terror are for the most part 
committed by non-State actors, either 
persons acting individually or, more 
frequently, non-State armed groups acting 
through a transnational network of agents. 
The difficulty, at least for keeping within the 
classical framework of public international 
law, lies with the fact that these groups do 
not at first glance appear to be subjects of 
international law, thereby not fulfilling the 
“subjective” element. If a wrongful act cannot 
be attributed to a subject of international 
law, there is no wrongful act of public 
international law and no responsibility for 
blatant acts of terrorism.107 Thus, a state is 
responsible for an act of terrorism by private 
actors where it exercises effective control 
over the act, or subsequently endorses it 
as its own. States may also be responsible 
for other wrongful acts related to acts of 
terrorism, such as failing to take reasonable 
measures to prevent their territories being 
used by terrorists. As a matter of law, state 
responsibility has serious implications for 
the wrong doing state and, potentially, for 
the rights and obligations of other states.108
There are basically two ways to ensure 
respect of certain rules of international law 
by non-State actors, particularly in those 
areas such as international human rights, 
humanitarian law and terrorism, where 
compliance with international law standards 
by these actors is most needed. The first 
technique consists of expanding the range of 
subjects of international law, thus including 
non-State entities, the second one of 
broadening the criteria of attribution for the 
purpose of triggering State responsibility.109
C.		 Development	 on	 General	 Definition	
of Terrorism
1.  Financing of Terrorism Convention
The enactment of the 1999 International 
Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism (hereafter: the 1999 
Financing of Terrorism Convention) was also 
motivated by the awareness of the inadequacy 
of the existing legal framework to deal with 
new forms of terror. For example, the terror 
attack against Swiss tourist in Luxor in 
1997, during which automatic weapons were 
used, did not fall within the scope of the 
1997 Terrorist Bombing Convention-which 
refers only to explosive device-or any other 
existing treaty.110 Laws against the financing 
of terrorism are not aimed at terrorist or even 
those who may sympathize with their cause, 
but business people who are required, on 
pain of criminal conviction, to use their own 
resources to ensure that they are not assisting 
terrorists. Such systems are also encouraged 
by lists distributed by international, regional 
and domestic agencies of people who are 
designated as terrorists, lists that are often 
incorporated in the domestic law of many 
nations.111 
While this Convention addresses one 
aspect of terrorism, it contains a generic 
107 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, supra note 103, at p. 6-7.
108 Helen Duffy, supra note 9, at p. 69.
109 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, supra note 103, at p. 7.
110 Roberta Arnold, supra note 53, at p. 23-24.
111 Kent Roach, the Criminal Law and Terrorism, in Victor V. Ramraj (eds.), 2005, Global Anti­Terrorism Law 
and Policy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, at p. 138.
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definition of shorts by describing terrorism 
as “any act intended to cause death or 
serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any 
person not taking an active part in hostilities 
in a situation of armed conflict, when the 
purpose of such act, by its nature or context, 
is to intimidate a population or to compel a 
government or an international organization 
to do or to abstain from doing an act. 
Alongside this formula in Article 2 (1) (b), 
the Convention provides that “terrorism”, 
so far as covered by the Convention, is 
that conduct covered by specific terrorist 
conventions addressing particular forms of 
terrorism.112
The 1999 definition is an indirect 
definition, which exclusively serves 
the purpose of defining a “secondary” 
(accessory) offense related to certain 
“primary” activities which are implicitly 
deemed to be acts of terrorism. The very 
existence of this definition makes the need to 
adopt a general definition of the “primary” 
offense even more evident. In fact, is seems 
paradoxical that the financing of terrorism 
as a whole is considered to be an offense, 
whereas terrorism itself is only criminalized 
if it consists of specific acts covered by 
the “sectoral” treaties.113 The reference 
in paragraph (1) (a) to pre-existing anti-
terrorism treaties proves that the majority 
of states have at least agreed on some of the 
basic features of terrorism. Thus, a possible 
solution to tackle it comprehensively would 
be to adopt a definition that synthesizes all 
the offenses contained in the anti-terrorism 
treaties listed in the annex to the convention. 
A caveat, however, is that since these treaties 
have not been universally ratified yet, the 
acceptance of such a definition would not be 
guaranteed.114
As far as international criminal law 
and procedure are concerned, apart from the 
definition of the offense of terrorist financing, 
an important feature of the 1999 Convention 
is that it obliges states to hold a legal 
person liable “when a person responsible 
for the management or control of that legal 
entity has, in that capacity, committed an 
offense described in Article 2.”115 The 1999 
Convention is, therefore, the first treaty in 
force at the world level which contains a 
general definition of acts of terrorism. This 
definition confirms the assumption that, 
in order to distinguish terrorist acts from 
ordinary offenses, it is inevitable to include 
a specific “terrorist” intent or purpose as an 
element of the crime; this specific “terrorist” 
intent is described in identical terms in the 
draft comprehensive convention on the 
suppression of terrorism which is currently 
being elaborated within the UN Ad Hoc 
Committee.116
2. Draft Comprehensive Convention
The initiative for a comprehensive 
treaty definition of terrorism was a response 
to calls beginning in the 1990s for a departure 
112 Helen Duffy, supra note 9, at p. 20.
113 Andrea Gioia, supra note 13, at p. 13.
114 Roberta Arnold, supra note 53, at p. 25.
115 Andrea Gioia, supra note 13, at p. 12.
116 Andrea Gioia, supra note 13, at p. 13.
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from a regime of variegated subject-specific 
treaties.117 The said sectoral and incremental 
– but not inconsistent – approach leaves 
lacunae since the conventions do not cover 
terrorist acts such as murder done by, e.g., 
shooting. The draft of a comprehensive 
convention currently under consideration 
by the Ad Hoc Committee and the Sixth 
Committee of the GA should remedy this. 
A general offense of terrorism to fill any 
lacunae left by sectoral conventions.118 
The initiative had come originally 
from India, and negotiations are currently 
on going. United Nations General Assembly 
resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996 had 
established an Ad Hoc Committee which, 
together with the United Nations’ Sixth 
(Legal) Committee, is currently tasked with 
negotiations of the Draft Comprehensive 
Convention.119 The elaboration of a 
comprehensive convention on international 
terrorism is not designed to replace the 
existing “sectoral” treaties dealing with 
specific categories of acts of terrorism, but 
rather to complement them in order to fill 
existing gaps; the comprehensive convention 
is expected to oblige states to consider as 
offenses certain acts, defined in Article 2 
and thus implicitly deemed to be terrorist 
acts, even if they are not covered by existing 
treaties.120
The current informal definition of 
terrorism for the purposes of the Draft 
Comprehensive Convention (Article 2), 
prepared by the Coordinator for negotiating 
purposes, defines terrorism as unlawfully 
and intentionally causing (a) death or 
serious bodily injury to any person; (b) 
serious damage to public and private 
property, including a State or government 
facility; or (c) other such damage where it is 
likely to result in major economic loss. The 
definition further requires that “the purpose 
of the conduct, by its nature or context, is 
to intimidate a population or to compel a 
Government or an international organization 
to do or abstain from doing any act”.121 
However, beyond the rhetoric, strikingly 
little progress appears to have been made in 
achieving consensus over a generic definition 
of terrorism for the Draft Comprehensive 
Convention, and old divisions continued 
to characterize the negotiations.122 The two 
main provisions of the draft comprehensive 
convention on which states were not prepared 
to compromise their position were whether 
the definition of terrorism should exclude (1) 
the activities carried out in people’s struggle 
for self-determination, and (2) the acts of 
armed forces during an armed conflict.123
The discussion on the definition issue 
has centred on a proposal made on behalf 
117 C.L. Lim, supra note 47, p. 37.
118 Volker Roben, The Role of International Conventions and General International Law in the Fight against Inter-
national Terrorism, in Christian Walter, 2004, Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law: 
Security versus Liberty, Springer, Berlin, at p. 816.
119 C.L. Lim, supra note 47, at p. 37.
120 Andrea, supra note 13, at p. 14.
121 Helen Duffy, supra note 9, at p. 21; Informal text of Article 2, Report of the Working Group on Measures to 
Eliminate International Terrorism; UN Doc. A/C.6/56/L.9, Annex I.B.
122 Helen Duffy, supra note 9, at p. 21.
123 Surya P. Subedi, supra note 2, at p. 214.
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of the Organisation of Islamic Conference 
(OIC), which seeks to clearly differentiate 
between terrorism and the legitimate 
struggle of people in the exercise of the right 
to self-determination and independence of 
all people under foreign occupation.124 The 
West European group, opposed the proposal 
stating that while recognizing that people’s 
struggle for the right to self-determination 
referred to in the proposal is legitimate and 
accepted under international law, the struggle 
could not be carried out by whatever means, 
but only within the confines of the rules of 
armed conflict, which rules prohibit act of 
terrorism.125
The same is true of the activities of 
armed forces during an armed conflict. 
Whether or not the provision contained in 
Draft Article 18 (2) is included in the final 
text of the comprehensive convention on 
international terrorism, it cannot alter the 
jus cogens character of the laws of armed 
conflict. The armed forces of a state, even 
when they are acting against terrorist, are not 
allowed to harm civilians or civilian targets 
and undermine the principles of general 
international law concerning the prohibition 
on the use of force and non-interference. In 
the name of writing a new law on terrorism 
in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 
9/11, states were not inclined to undo the 
basic principles of international law.126 
The absence of a comprehensive treaty 
definition of terrorism had its shortcomings, 
not least of which was the missed opportunity 
here of stimulating more comprehensive 
legal doctrine under general or customary 
international law, existing alongside such 
a comprehensive treaty definition. The 
emergence of parallel customary rules, 
arising alongside treaty rules, has long been 
recognized in international law doctrine.127 
At least immediately following September 
11, then, the quest for a global terrorism 
convention appeared to become accepted 
as a political reality, while the feasibility 
of achieving such a Convention, its precise 
content or scope, and of course the support 
that it might eventually muster, remain 
shrouded in uncertainty.128
D. Conclusion
A common definition is necessary 
and indispensable to any serious attempt to 
combat terrorism. Without such a definition, 
a coordinated fight against international 
terrorism is likely to remain fragmented and 
ineffective. This was stated in the opinion of 
the League of Nations Council: namely that 
the definition is needed in order to enable 
international cooperation.129
The problem that makes it very dif-
ficult for the international community to 
adopt a universally accepted legal defini-
tion of terrorism is the political component 
of terrorism.130 Thus, the general accept-
ability of a definition of terrorism depends 
fundamentally on a certain political homoge-
124 See Informal text prepared by the Coordinator, UN Doc.A/AC.252/2002/CRP.1.
125 A.R. Perera, supra note 32, at p. 584.
126 Surya P. Subedi, supra note 2, at p. 216.
127 C.L. Lim, supra note 47, at p. 46.
128 Helen Duffy, supra note 9, at p. 23.
129 Gerhard Hafner, supra note 58, at p. 35.
130 Roberto Arnold, supra note 53, at p. 4.
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neity or at least ideological vicinity.131 These 
conditions are not likely to be met any time 
soon, which raises the question of how to 
go forward despite the limitations outlined 
in this paper. Waiting for conditions to arise 
that would make a comprehensive definition 
workable is unacceptable in that it would 
hobble such progress that has been made un-
der the sectoral approach. Moving forward 
and elaborating the sectoral, piecemeal ap-
proach to defining and prosecuting terrorism 
has the potential of accelerating the process 
of reaching a breakthrough on the divides 
preventing a comprehensive definition.132
131 Gerhard Hafner, supra note 58, at p. 36.
132 Gerhard Hafner, supra note 58, at p. 43.
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